Introduction
I have this "madly optimistic" (Mermin called it) feeling that Bohrian-Paulian ideas will lead us to the next stage of physics. That is, that thinking about quantum foundations from their point of view will be the beginning of a new path, not the end of an old one.
-Christopher A. Fuchs The beginning of the 21st Century saw the launch of a novel interpretation of quantum mechanics, by Carlton Caves, Chris Fuchs, and Ruediger Schack. 2 Initially conceived as an extended personalist Bayesian theory of probability called "Quantum Bayesianism," it has since been re-branded as "QBism," the term David Mermin 3 prefers, considering it "as big a break with 20th century ways of thinking about science as Cubism was with 19th century ways of thinking about art." The big break lies not in the emphasis that the mathematical apparatus of quantum mechanics is a probability calculus-that ought to surprise no one-but in this plus a radically subjective Bayesian interpretation of probability plus a radically subjective interpretation of the events to which (and on the basis of which) probabilities are assigned.
Recently the referent of the "B" in QBism became moot. While Mermin 4 suggested that it should stand for Bruno de Finetti ("Quantum Brunoism"), Chris Fuchs and Blake Stacey 5 suggested that it should stand for Bettabilitarianism. This word was coined by Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., about whom Louis Menand wrote (as quoted by Fuchs and Stacey):
Complete certainty was an illusion; of that he was certain. There were only greater and lesser degrees of certainty, and that was enough. It was, in fact, better than enough; for although we always want to reduce the degree of uncertainty in our lives, we never want it to disappear entirely, since uncertainty is what puts the play in the joints. Imprecision, the sportiveness, as it were, of the quantum, is what makes life interesting and change possible. Holmes liked to call himself a "bettabilitarian": we cannot know what consequences the universe will attach to our choices, but we can bet on them, and we do it every day.
With the present paper, I vote that the "B" in QBism should stand for Niels Bohr. The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explains why Bohr nowadays seems obscure to most physicists. Section 3 identifies the contextuality of physical quantities as Bohr's essential contribution to Kant's theory of science. (Affinities between Bohr's theory of science and Kant's have been noted by a number of scholars. [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] ) Section 4 outlines Kant's theory of science, its contextuality, and its decontextualization. Section 5 distinguishes three kinds of realism: the "good" (internal) realism of Kant and Bohr, the "bad" naive realism, which deems either measuring instruments or quantum states to be mind-independently real, and the "ugly" realism that is associated with the representative theory of perception. Section 6 discusses an important change in Bohr's vocabulary: in order to preserve the decontextualization of Kant's theory, he moved from talking about "our forms of perception" to talking about experimental arrangements. In line with this, as discussed in Sec. 7, he substituted phenomena for objects as the principal referents of atomic physics.
The conceptual framework staked out by Kant, which provides the general structure for a language of objects that is independent of subjects, is the very framework that undergirds the "plain, unambiguous language" on the use of which Bohr so forcefully insisted. It is therefore an irony that Bohr, seeing Kant as arguing for the necessary validity and the unlimited reach of classical concepts, regarded complementarity as an alternative to Kant's theory of science. While Kant did not anticipate the possibility of an empirical knowledge that did not involve the organization of sense-impressions into objects-an empirical knowledge that was therefore beyond the reach of classical concepts-he was absolutely right in insisting on the necessary validity of classical concepts, and so was Bohr. This is discussed in Sec. 8. Section 9 briefly surveys the philosophically rather barren period between the passing of Niels Bohr and the advent of QBism.
The discussion of QBism begins in Sec. 10, with particular focus on Wigner's conundrum regarding himself and his friend, the Heisenberg cut (Bell's shifty split), and QBists' less than consistent use of "the (objective or external) world." Sometimes the phrase refers to "the common external world we have all negotiated with each other," and othertimes it refers to "the world as it is without agents." QBists see only one alternative to placing the Heisenberg cut inside the objective world, which is to place it at the boundary between the subject and its objects. In Sec. 11 I argue that there is another alternative, which is to place it at the boundary between "the common external world we have all negotiated with each other" and "the world as it is without agents." By doing so one avoids coherent superpositions of outcome-indicating properties without falling into Bell's "fapp trap." The concluding section contains some quibbles about QBist misrepresentations of Bohr's philosophy, the role of language, and the strange claim that quantum mechanics is explicitly local in the QBist interpretation. To make this claim is to concede way too much to those who fancy themselves as modeling a reality not of their own making. QBism is neither local nor nonlocal in the realist's sense of these terms. An outline of the more technical aspect of QBism is provided as an appendix.
While Bohr never lost sight of the universal context of human experience, QBism, through its emphasis on the individual experiencing subject, brings home the intersubjective constitution of our common external world more forcefully than Bohr did. If measurements are irreversible and outcomes definite, it is because the experiences of each subject are irreversible and definite. Bohr, on the other hand, gave us all the arguments we need (and QBism so far lacks) to extend to our common external world the irreversibility of measurements and the definiteness of outcomes.
Why Bohr seems obscure
As a philosopher Niels Bohr was either one of the great visionary figures of all time, or merely the only person courageous enough to confront head on, whether or not successfully, the most imponderable mystery we have yet unearthed. -N. David Mermin 16 Today, Bohr seems obscure to most physicists. Catherine Chevalley 17 has identified three reasons why. The first is that Bohr's views have come to be equated with one variant or another of the Copenhagen interpretation, which only emerged in the mid-1950's, in response to David Bohm's hiddenvariables theory and the Marxist critique of Bohr's alleged idealism, which had inspired Bohm. The second is that Bohr's readers will usually not find in his writings what they expected to find, while they will find a number of things that they did not expect. What they expect is a take on the measurement problem, the so-called Heisenberg cut, the quantum-to-classical transition, locality, etc. What they find instead is discussions of philosophical issues such as the meaning of "objectivity," of "reality," of "truth," the role of language etc. Bohr's thinking is situated in a complex and diverse epistemological context that developed in Germany starting with Immanuel Kant. In this context, the fundamental problem was: how are phenomena given to us in intuition, and how do we build objects starting from what is given to us?
The third reason is that the task of making sense of quantum mechanics is seen today as one of grafting a metaphysical narrative onto a mathematical formalism, in a language that is philosophically vague enough to allow for general understanding. For Bohr, as also for Werner Heisenberg and Wolfgang Pauli, the real issues lay deeper. They judged that the conceptual difficulties posed by quantum mechanics called in question the general framework of thought, its concepts, and its criteria of consistency.
Contextuality
Immanuel Kant, the most important philosopher of the modern era, demonstrated that it was possible to provide a scientific theory with much stronger justification than mere empirical adequacy. The kind of argument inaugurated by him to this end begins by assuming that a certain proposition p is true, and then shows that another proposition q, stating a precondition for the truth of p, must also be true. For him, the relevant proposition p was the assumption that empirical knowledge was possible, and the corresponding proposition q was the conclusion that certain universal laws of nature must hold. One such law was that "[a]ll alterations occur in accordance with the law of the connection of cause and effect".
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"Reason," Kant wrote, "must approach nature with its principles in one hand . . . and, in the other hand, the experiments thought out in accordance with these principles." The law of universal causation is such a principle. The principles are formulated using concepts whose meanings are rooted in our cognitive faculties of intuition a and thought. If experiments are thought out in accordance with them, then we are in a position to understand nature's answers: "what reason would not be able to know of itself and has to learn from nature, it has to seek in the latter" but it has to do this "in accordance with what reason itself puts into nature".
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What Kant did not anticipate was that experiments might not merely serve to provide intelligible answers but themselves play the defining roles he ascribed to our cognitive faculties-that they were needed not only to answer but also to ask meaningful questions. The insight that certain questions are contextual -that they are meaningless without the experimental arrangements by which answers are elicited-is due to Bohr. b His thesis that, out of relation to experimental arrangements, physical quantities are undefined, has been spectacularly borne out by the no-go theorems of John Bell, 21 Simon Kochen and Ernst Specker, 22 and Alexander Klyachko and coworkers. 23 
Decontextualization
Bohr's contextuality, however, was not the first to play an important role in natural philosophy. From the end of the 17th century onwards, it was widely accepted by philosophers that objects existed relative to a context, to wit, human experience. By placing the subject of empirical science squarely into the context of human experience, Kant dispelled many qualms that had been shared by thinkers at the end of the 18th century-qualms about the objective nature of geometry, about the purely mathematical nature a The German original, Anschauung, covers both visual perception and visual imagination. b And the insight that contextuality is Bohr's essential contribution of Kant's theory of science is due to Michel Bitbol. 20 of Newton's theory, about the unintelligibility of action at a distance, and about Galileo's principle of relativity.
Concerning the laws of geometry, which apply to objects constructed by us in the space of our imagination, the question was why they should also apply to the physical world. Kant's answer was that they apply to objects perceived as well as to objects imagined because visual perception and visual imagination share the same space.
c As to the mathematical nature of Newtonian mechanics, it was justified, not by the Neo-Platonic belief that the book of nature was written in mathematical language, but by its being a precondition of scientific knowledge. What makes it possible to conceive of appearances as aspects of an objective world is the mathematical regularities that obtain between them. Newton's refusal to explain action at a distance was similarly justified, inasmuch as the only intelligible causality available to us consists in lawful mathematical relations between phenomena: for the Moon to be causally related to the Earth was for the Moon to stand in a regular mathematical relation to the Earth. As to the principle of relativity, ditto: lawful mathematical relations only exist between phenomena, and thus only between objects or objective events, but never between a particular phenomenon and space or time itself. Kant's premise was that "space and time are only forms of sensible intuition, and therefore only conditions of the existence of the things as appearances." It follows that we have no concepts of the understanding and hence no elements for the cognition of things except insofar as an intuition can be given corresponding to these concepts, consequently that we can have cognition of no object as a thing in itself, but only insofar as it is an object of sensible intuition, i.e. as an appearance; from which follows the limitation of all even possible speculative cognition of reason to mere objects of experience. Yet . . . even if we cannot cognize these same objects as [i.e., know them to be] things c It is noteworthy that Kant's argument applies, not to Euclidean geometry specifically, even though it was the only geometry known in Kant's time, but to geometry in general, and thus to whichever geometry is best suited to formulating the laws of physics. It has even been said that Kant's theory of science set in motion a series of re-conceptualizations of the relationship between geometry and physics that eventuated in Einstein's theories of relativity. 24 d Here, too, it would be an anachronism to argue that Kant singled out Galilean relativity, even though it was the only relativity known in his time. His argument holds for every possible principle of relativity, including Einstein's. in themselves, we at least must be able to think them as things in themselves. For otherwise there would follow the absurd proposition that there is an appearance without anything that appears.
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Before Kant, there appears to have been no philosopher who did not have a correspondence theory of truth, and who did not think of the relation of sense impressions to the external world as a relation of similarity-hence the aforementioned qualms shared by thinkers at the end of the 18th century. Kant showed that the predictive success of a scientific theory does not have to be attributed to some empirically inaccessible correspondence between the structure of the theory and the structure of the real world. He did this by establishing a far-reaching dependence of scientific concepts on human intuition and the logical structure of our thought.
Needless to say, this had to be done without calling into question the objectivity of science, and thus in a way that allowed people to think of phenomena as appearances of things "out there." We must be able to decontextualize the objective world, to forget that it depends on us. And if there is only the single universal context of human experience, it is easily done. We are free to think of perceived objects as faithful representations of real objects (things in themselves). We are free to forget that the relations holding between them owe their spatiotemporal qualities or their space/time-related meanings to our mental faculties. This is how it came about that, by the end of the 19th century, Kant's theory of science had squelched most skeptical scruples about the reality of the external world.
Realism good, bad, and ugly
In an essay written during the last year of his life, 26 Erwin Schrödinger expressed his astonishment at the fact that despite "the absolute hermetic separation of my sphere of consciousness" from everyone else's, there is "a far-reaching structural similarity between certain parts of our experiences, the parts which we call external; it can be expressed in the brief statement that we all live in the same world." This similarity, Schrödinger avowed, "is not rationally comprehensible. In order to grasp it we are reduced to two irrational, mystical hypotheses," one of which e is "the so-called hypothesis of the real external world." Schrödinger left no room for uncertainty about what he thought of this hypothesis. To invoke "the existence of a real world e The alternative hypothesis, which he endorsed, was "that we are all really only various aspects of the One". 27 
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of bodies which are the causes of sense-impressions and produce roughly the same impression on everybody . . . is not to give an explanation at all; it is simply to state the matter in different words. In fact, it means laying a completely useless burden on the understanding." It means uselessly translating the statement "everybody agrees about something" into the statement "there exists a real world which causes everybody's agreement." Instead of explaining the fact expressed by the first statement, the second merely reinforces its incomprehensibility, for the relation between this postulated real world and those aspects of our experiences about which there is agreement, is something we cannot know. The causal relations we know are internal to those parts of our experiences about which we agree.
In ancient and medieval philosophy, to be was either to be a substance or to be a property of a substance. Substance was self-existent; everything else depended on a substance for its existence. With Descartes, the human conscious subject assumed the role of substance: to be became either to be a subject or to exist as a representation for a subject. Thus was born the representative theory of perception, and with it the aforesaid burden on the understanding. In the eyes of philosopher John Searle, the move from the older view that "we really perceive real objects" to the view that we only perceive sense-impressions was "the greatest single disaster in the history of philosophy over the past four centuries". 28 A disaster it was indeed, not least because it continues to muddy most scientific accounts of sensory perception.
f The representative theory of perception poses this dilemma: either the gap between representations and the objects they are supposed to represent can never be bridged, or the world is reduced to representations. Either science deals with objects in the real world, in which case we have no justifiable idea of how we come to have representations, or it deals with representations, in which case we have no justifiable knowledge of the real f Such accounts tend to begin by assuming the existence of a mind-independent external world, in which objects emit photons and/or sound waves, which stimulate peripheral nerve endings (retinas or ear drums). The stimulated nerves then send signals to the brain, where neural processes miraculously give rise to perceptual experience. The plain truth is that nobody knows how to bridge this "explanatory gap". 29 "Nobody has the slightest idea how anything material could be conscious. Nobody even knows what it would be like to have the slightest idea about how anything material could be conscious. So much for the philosophy of consciousness." These words ring as true in 2019 as they did in 1992, when they were written by Jerry Fodor. 30 While said accounts begin by assuming that science talks about events in a mind-independent external world, they lead to the conclusion that we have access only to perceptual experience, and that there is no way we could ever have access to that external world.
world. Transcendental philosophy, inaugurated by Kant and continued in the 20th century by Edmund Husserl, 31 emerged as a critique of the representative theory. In an attempt to defend the older, direct realism, Searle has invoked the fact that we are able communicate with other human beings, using publicly available meanings in a public language. For this to work, he argues, 32 we have to assume common, publicly available objects of reference: So, for example, when I use the expression "this table" I have to assume that you understand the expression in the same way that I intend it. I have to assume we are both referring to the same table, and when you understand me in my utterance of "this table" you take it as referring to the same object you refer to in this context in your utterance of "this table."
The implication then is that you and I share a perceptual access to one and the same object. And that is just another way of saying that I have to presuppose that you and I are both seeing or otherwise perceiving the same public object. But that public availability of that public world is precisely the direct realism that I am here attempting to defend.
Searle points out that his argument is transcendental in Kant's sense. Here p is the assumption that we are able to communicate with each other in a public language, and q is the conclusion that there must be publicly available objects in a public world about which we can communicate in a public language. The actual implication of his argument, however, is the agreement between our respective "spheres of consciousness"-between what exists for me, in my experience, and what exists for you, in your experience-which so astonished Schrödinger. It allows us to communicate with each other as if direct realism were true. What Searle succeeds in defending against the "ugly" representative realism is not the "bad" direct realism but the "good" internal realism of the transcendental philosophers (to use a term coined by Hilary Putnam 33 ) . The key role language plays in establishing the rationally incomprehensible correspondence between the "external parts" of our internal experiences, was also emphasized by Schrödinger: What does establish it is language, including everything in the way of expression, gesture, taking hold of another person, pointing with one's finger and so forth, though none of this breaks through that inexorable, absolute division between spheres of consciousness. 26 
From forms of perception to experimental arrangements
The hallmark of empirical knowledge is objectivity. To Kant, objectivity meant two things: intersubjective agreement, and the possibility of thinking of appearances as experiences of objects. His inquiry into the preconditions of empirical science was essentially an inquiry into the preconditions of the possibility of organizing sense-impressions into objects. And in the new domain opened up by quantum mechanics this possibility no longer exists. As Schrödinger 34 wrote, Atoms-our modern atoms, the ultimate particles-must no longer be regarded as identifiable individuals. This is a stronger deviation from the original idea of an atom than anybody had ever contemplated. We must be prepared for anything.
For the present-day physicist, it is not easy to understand the bewilderment that the founders and their contemporaries experienced in the early days of the quantum theory:
All the verities of the preceding two centuries, held by physicists and ordinary people alike, simply fell apart-collapsed. We had to start all over again, and we came up with something that worked just beautifully but was so strange that nobody had any idea what it meant except Bohr, and practically nobody could understand him. So naturally we kept probing further, getting to smaller and smaller length scales, waiting for the next revolution to shed some light on the meaning of the old one.
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That revolution never came. Quantum mechanics works as beautifully in the nucleus as it does in the atom; and it works as beautifully in the nucleon as it does in the nucleus, seven or eight orders of magnitude below the level for which it was designed. (It also works beautifully many orders of magnitude above that level, as for example in a superconductor.) But should this surprise us? The alternative is between contextuality and decontextualization, and those who hope to salvage decontextualization (which has never been more than an "as if") are beating a dead horse. The question is not (nor ever was or will be): how do we get from mathematical symbols, conceived as representations of a mind-independent reality, to physics laboratories, to people, and to subjects experiencing an objective world? The question was (and remains): how does the reality of atomic phenomena differ from the reality of the experimental procedures by which evidence about atomic phenomena is gained? "Without sensibility no object would be given to us," Kant wrote,
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"and without understanding none would be thought." Bohr could not have agreed more, insisting as he did that meaningful physical concepts have not only mathematical but also visualizable content. Such concepts are associated with pictures, like the picture of a particle following a trajectory or the picture of a wave propagating in space. In the classical theory, a single picture could accommodate all of the properties a system can have. When quantum theory came along, that all-encompassing picture fell apart, much to everyone's consternation. Unless certain experimental conditions obtained, it was impossible to picture the electron as following a trajectory (which was nevertheless a routine presupposition in setting up SternGerlach experiments and in interpreting cloud-chamber photographs), and there was no way in which to apply the concept of position. And unless certain other, incompatible, experimental conditions obtained, it was impossible to picture the electron as a traveling wave (which was nevertheless a routine presupposition in interpreting the scattering of electrons by crystals), and there was no way in which to apply the concept of momentum. Bohr settled on the nexus between pictures, physical concepts, and experimental arrangements as key to "the task of bringing order into an entirely new field of experience". 37 If the visualizable content of physical concepts cannot be described in terms of compatible pictures, it has to be described in terms of something that can be so described, and what can be so described are the incompatible experimental conditions under which the incompatible physical concepts can be employed. The incompatibility of experimental arrangements implies "a complementarity of the possibilities of definition", 38 and for this reason "the specification of [the whole experimental arrangement] is imperative for any well-defined application of the quantum-mechanical formalism".
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The transition from pictures to experimental arrangements did not happen overnight. In his earlier writings, Bohr made frequent reference to "our forms of perception": "we must remember, above all, that, as a matter of course, all new experience makes its appearance within the frame of our customary points of view and forms of perception"; 39 "at the same time as every doubt regarding the reality of atoms has been removed, . . . we have been reminded in an instructive manner of the natural limitation of our forms of perception";
40 "the difficulties concerning our forms of perception, which arise in the atomic theory. . . , may be considered as an instructive reminder of the general conditions underlying the creation of man's concepts". 41 What Bohr meant by "our forms of perceptions" may be gleaned from a 1922 letter to his philosophical mentor Harald Høffding: "my personal opinion is that these difficulties are of such a kind that they hardly allow us to hope, within the world of atoms, to implement a description in space and time of the kind corresponding to our usual sensory images". Over time Bohr realized that it was more expedient to defend the objectivity of the quantum theory with references to "experimental conditions" or "arrangements" than with references to "pictures," "sensory images," or "forms of perception." As Jørgen Kalckar remarked, 43 when the phrase "forms of perception" was replaced by "experimental arrangement", "the objectivity of physical observations" could be stressed without the somewhat bewildering addition that it could be "particularly suited to emphasize the subjective character of all experience."
It is certainly easier to digest a statement like "the objective character of the description in atomic physics depends on the detailed specification of the experimental conditions under which evidence is gained", 44 but it is also easier to misconstrue such a statement as endorsing not the intended internal realism but a direct realism (or worse) with regard to measuring instruments.
From objects to phenomena
In the new domain opened up by quantum mechanics, the possibility of organizing sense-impressions into objects, which for Kant was a precondition of the possible of empirical knowledge, does not exist. In this domain there are no sense impressions waiting to be organized into objects. In one sense, therefore, we know less: what is inaccessible to our senses cannot be expected to conform to the spatiotemporal conditions of human experience, and therefore cannot be expected to be expressible by means of concepts that owe their visualizable content to these conditions. g But in g While position and orientation are in an obvious sense visualizable, linear and angular momentum derive their meanings from the symmetry properties of space or the invariant behavior of closed systems under translations and rotations, and energy derives its another sense we know more: "the mutual exclusion of any two experimental procedures, permitting the unambiguous definition of complementary physical quantities, . . . provides room for new physical laws". 45 What Bohr added to Kant's theory of science was his insight that empirical knowledge was not necessarily limited to what is directly accessible to our senses, and that, therefore, it does not have to be solely a knowledge of (re-identifiable) objects and causally connected events.
However, since "the facts which are revealed to us by the quantum theory . . . lie outside the domain of our ordinary forms of perception", 46 all we have to describe these facts is "a purely symbolic scheme permitting only predictions . . . as to results obtainable under conditions specified by means of classical concepts". 47 Bohr's emphatic rejection of the familiar language of objects when dealing with these facts cannot be overemphasized. There is no object to be disturbed, and no object which measurements could furnish with attributes:
The unaccustomed features of the situation with which we are confronted in quantum theory necessitate the greatest caution as regards all questions of terminology. Speaking, as is often done, of disturbing a phenomenon by observation, or even of creating physical attributes to objects by measuring processes, is, in fact, liable to be confusing, since all such sentences imply a departure from basic conventions of language which, even though it sometimes may be practical for the sake of brevity, can never be unambiguous. It is certainly far more in accordance with the structure and interpretation of the quantum mechanical symbolism, as well as with elementary epistemological principles, to reserve the word "phenomenon" for the comprehension of the effects observed under given experimental conditions.
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"These conditions," Bohr goes on to say, "which include the account of the properties and manipulation of all measuring instruments essentially concerned, constitute in fact the only basis for the definition of the concepts by which the phenomenon is described." The definite definition of "phenomenon," which takes over when phenomena in the older sense of the term do not exist or cannot be organized into objects, is given in the following passage:
meaning from the uniformity of time or the invariant behavior of closed systems under time translations.
all unambiguous interpretation of the quantum mechanical formalism involves the fixation of the external conditions, defining the initial state of the atomic system concerned and the character of the possible predictions as regards subsequent observable properties of that system. Any measurement in quantum theory can in fact only refer either to a fixation of the initial state or to the test of such predictions, and it is first the combination of measurements of both kinds which constitutes a well-defined phenomenon.
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Where there is no object that can be disturbed, where even the dichotomy of objects and attributes created for them by measuring processes is suspect, the very dichotomy of physical system and experimental arrangement becomes suspect. Not only the measured properties but the systems themselves are defined by the experimental conditions under which they are observed.
h Bohr sometimes spoke of "irreversible amplification effects." This suggests that something reversible is going on beneath or behind the phenomena, which has to be (as John Wheeler 51 put it) "brought to a close by an irreversible act of amplification such as the blackening of a grain of silver bromide emulsion or the triggering of a photodetector." But this is to take the view of the "Newmanniac," who transmogrifies statistical laws correlating observations into physical processes interspersed with observations, or the view of the "Ψ-ontologist," who aims to reify such laws into physical processes giving rise to observations. For Bohr, nothing is going on between "the fixation of the external conditions, defining the initial state of the atomic system concerned" and "the subsequent observable properties of that system." What makes the so-called amplification effects irreversible is "the irreversibility in principle of the very notion of observation", 52 "the essential irreversibility inherent in the very concept of observation", 53 and by this he meant the incontestably irreversible definiteness of human senh In her commendable monograph Particle Metaphysics, 50 Brigitte Falkenburg writes: "only the experimental context (and our ways of conceiving of it in classical terms) makes it possible to talk in a sloppy way of quantum objects. . . . Bare quantum 'objects' are just bundles of properties which underlie superselection rules and which exhibit non-local, acausal correlations. . . . They seem to be Lockean empirical substances, that is, collections of empirical properties which constantly go together. However, they are only individuated by the experimental apparatus in which they are measured or the concrete quantum phenomenon to which they belong. . . . They can only be individuated as context-dependent quantum phenomena. Without a given experimental context, the reference of quantum concepts goes astray. In this point, Bohr is absolutely right up to the present day." sory experience, as distinct from the irreversibility of hypothetical processes leading to permanent marks existing out of relation to human sensory experience.
Concepts and language
As Schrödinger correctly stressed, the existence of a public world, about which we are able to communicate with each other in a public language, cannot be rationally explained. We may, however, ask: what is it about our experience that makes it an experience of a public world?
In answer, Kant might have pointed out that we share the logical structure of a common language and the spatiotemporal structure of a common intuition. The logical relation between a (logical) subject and a predicate makes it possible for us to think of a particular nexus of perceptions as the properties of a substance, connected to it as predicates are connected to a subject. It makes it possible for me to think of perceptions as connected not by me, in my experience, but in an object "out there" in the public world. The logical relation between antecedent and consequent (if . . . then. . . ) makes it possible for us to think of what we perceive at different times as properties of substances connected by causality. It makes it possible for me to think of asynchronous perceptions as connected not merely in my experience but also objectively, by a causal nexus "out there." And the category of community or reciprocity, which Kant associated with the disjunctive relation (either. . . or. . . ), makes it possible for us to think of what we perceive in different locations as properties of substances connected by a reciprocal action. It makes it possible for me to think of simultaneous perceptions as connected not only in my experience but objectively. (Kant thought that by establishing a reciprocal relation, we establish not only an objective spatial relation but also an objective relation of simultaneity.)
But to be able to think of perceptions as properties of substances, or as causally connected, or as affecting each other, the connections must be regular. For perceptions to be perceptions of a particular kind of thing (say, an elephant), they must be connected in an orderly way, according to a concept denoting a lawful concurrence of perceptions. For perceptions to be causally connected, like (say) lightning and thunder, they must fall under a causal law, according to which one perception necessitates the subsequent occurrence of another. (By establishing a causal relation falling under a causal law, we also establish an objective temporal relation.) And for perceptions to be reciprocally connected, like (say) the Earth and the Moon, they must affect each other according to a reciprocal law, such as Newton's law of gravity. It is through lawful connections in the "manifold of appearances" that we are able to think of appearances as perceptions of a self-existent system of causally evolving (and thus re-identifiable) objects, from which we, the experiencing subjects, can remove ourselves.
In Bohr's time and the cultural environment in which he lived, Kant's theory of science still exercised considerable influence. There is no doubt in my mind that the conceptual framework staked out by Kant, i providing the general structure for a language of objects that is independent of subjects, is the very framework that undergirds the "plain, unambiguous language" on the use of which Bohr so forcefully insisted:
The argument is simply that by the word "experiment" we refer to a situation where we can tell others what we have done and what we have learned and that, therefore, the account of the experimental arrangement and of the results of the observations must be expressed in unambiguous language with suitable application of the terminology of classical physics.
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One day during tea at his institute, Bohr was sitting next to Edward Teller and Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker. As von Weizsäcker recalls, 56 when Teller suggested that "after a longer period of getting accustomed to quantum theory we might be able after all to replace the classical concepts by quantum theoretical ones," Bohr listened, apparently absent-mindedly, and said at last: "Oh, I understand. We also might as well say that we are not sitting here and drinking tea but that all this is merely a dream." If we are dreaming, we are unable to tell others what we have done and what we have learned. And so it would be a misconception to believe that the difficulties of the atomic theory may be evaded by eventually replacing the concepts of classical physics by new conceptual forms. . . . the recognition of the limitation of our forms of perception by no means implies that we can dispense with our customary ideas or their direct verbal expressions when reducing our sense impressions to order.
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[I]n spite of their limitation, we can by no means dispense with those forms of perception which colour our whole language and in terms of which all experience must ultimately be expressed.
41
i Cf. Bohr: "When speaking of a conceptual framework, we merely refer to an unambiguous logical representation of relations between experiences". 54 As Heisenberg put it, 58 "[t] here is no use in discussing what could be done if we were other beings than we are". j Bohr's claim that the classical language was indispensable, has been vindicated by the subsequent developments in particle physics:
This [claim] has remained valid up to the present day. At the individual level of clicks in particle detectors and particle tracks on photographs, all measurement results have to be expressed in classical terms. Indeed, the use of the familiar physical quantities of length, time, mass, and momentum-energy at a subatomic scale is due to an extrapolation of the language of classical physics to the non-classical domain.
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It is therefore an irony that Bohr, seeing Kant as arguing for the necessary validity and unlimited reach of classical concepts, regarded complementarity as an alternative to Kant's theory of science, thus drawing the battle lines in a way which put Kant and himself on opposing sides. Just as Kant did not argue for the universal validity of Euclidean geometry in particular (see Note c), nor for Galilean relativity in particular (see Note d), so his arguments did not, in effect, establish the unlimited reach of classical concepts. As his arguments merely established the validity of whichever geometry, and whichever principle of relativity, was the most convenient, so they merely established the necessary validity of classical concepts. What Kant did not anticipate was the possibility of empirical knowledge that did not involve the organization of sense-impressions into objects-an empirical knowledge that, while being obtained by means of sense-impressions organized into objects, was not a knowledge of sense-impressions organized into objects. Yet Kant was absolutely right in insisting on the necessary validity of classical concepts, and so was Bohr when he insisted that "the quantummechanical formalism . . . represents a purely symbolic scheme permitting only predictions . . . as to results obtainable under conditions specified by means of classical concepts". The latter may belong to the species 'man,' but not to the world as independent of men". 59 
The intervening years
Whereas for Bohr "the physical content of quantum mechanics" was "exhausted by its power to formulate statistical laws governing observations obtained under conditions specified in plain language", 61 John von Neumann 62 developed the mathematical part of the theory into an autonomous formal language. In doing so he turned the theory into a mathematical formalism in need of a physical interpretation.
What has now become a growth industry took shape in the 1950s. First David Bohm presented his hidden-variables interpretation, 63 then Hugh Everett put forward his relative-state interpretation, 64 and then Heisenberg entered the fray, arguing that the Copenhagen interpretation was the only viable interpretation. 65 He thereby transformed Bohr's views into just another interpretation of a mathematically formulated theory. Historically, Bohr's reply 66 to the argument by Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen 67 was taken as a definitive refutation by the physics community. During the "shut up and calculate" period of the post-war years, Bohr's perspective was lost. His paper, which only treated the mathematical formalism in a footnote, is now seen as missing the point.
By transmogrifying a probability algorithm-the "state" vector-into a bona fide physical state, adopting the eigenvalue-eigenstate link, k and modeling a measurement as a two-stage process ("pre-measurement" followed by "objectification"), von Neumann created what is commonly known as the measurement problem but is more appropriately called "the disaster of objectification".
69 This is how quantum mechanics came to be labeled as "the great scandal of physics", 70 as a theory that "makes absolutely no sense", 71 and as "the silliest" of all the theories proposed in the 20th century.
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What is responsible for these mischaracterizations should not be hard to detect: think of a quantum state's dependence on time as the timedependence of an evolving physical state, rather than as the dependence of probabilities on the time of the measurement to the possible outcomes of which they are assigned, and you have two modes of evolution whereas in reality there is not even one.
Yet today the reasons for these mischaracterizations are hard to detect.
k Thus formulated by Dirac: 68 "The expression that an observable 'has a particular value' for a particular state is permissible in quantum mechanics in the special case when a measurement of the observable is certain to lead to the particular value, so that the state is an eigenstate of the observable."
One of these reasons is the axiomatic method by which quantum mechanics is typically taught nowadays. l First students are told that the state of a quantum-physical system is (or is represented by) a normalized element of a Hilbert space. Then they are told that observables are (or are represented by) self-adjoint operators, and that the possible outcomes of a measurement are the eigenvalues of such an operator. Then comes a couple of axioms concerning the time evolution of states-unitary between measurements and in accordance with the projection postulate at the time of a measurement. A further axiom stipulates that the states of composite systems are (or are represented by) vectors in the tensor product of the Hilbert spaces of the component systems. And finally, almost as an afterthought, there comes an axiom about probabilities, the Born rule. This is how the The Ashgate Companion to Contemporary Philosophy of Physics 70 comes to distinguish between the "bare quantum formalism," described as "an elegant piece of mathematics" that is "prior to any notion of probability, measurement etc.," and the "quantum algorithm," described as "an ill-defined and unattractive mess," whose business it is to extract "empirical results" from the former. In actual fact, there is no bare quantum formalism. Every single axiom of the theory only makes sense as a feature of a probability calculus.
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There can be no denying that progress was made in the years between the passing of Niels Bohr and the advent of QBism, even enormous progress, but it concerned the development of complex, sophisticated, and astonishingly accurate probability algorithms, as well as the emergence of exciting quantum technologies. Yet with regard to the philosophical foundations, the progress made consisted chiefly in finding out what does not work.
Enter QBism
To the QBist, all probabilities are of the subjective, personalist Bayesian kind. They reside in the mind of the individual user (of quantum mechanics) or agent (in a quantum world). So does the compendium of probabilities l Another reason is this: While a junior-level classical mechanics course devotes a considerable amount of time to different formulations of classical mechanics, even graduate-level courses often emphasize one particular formulation of quantum mechanics almost to the exclusion of all variants, of which there are (at least) nine. 73 It would seem reasonable to expect that an interpretation of quantum mechanics be based on features that are common to all formulations of the theory, not on the mathematical idiosyncrasies of a particular formulation, such as the wave-function formulation. What is common to all formulations is that they afford tools for calculating correlations between measurement outcomes. that goes by the name "quantum state." And so do the events to which, as well as the data on the basis of which, probabilities are assigned. A measurement is any action a user takes to elicit one of a set of possible personal experiences. Such an action does not have to take place in a physics laboratory. It "can be anything from running across the street at L'Étoile in Paris (and gambling upon one's life) to a sophisticated quantum information experiment (and gambling on the violation of a Bell inequality)". 75 The only thing a QBist "does not model with quantum mechanics is her own direct internal awareness of her own private experience".
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The immediate advantage this buys the QBist over the "Newmanniac" or the "Ψ-ontologist" is her immunity to the disaster of objectification. The incontestable definiteness of experience implies the incontestable definiteness of measurement outcomes. Two of the pseudo-problems that a quantum-state realist has to contend with are thus taken care of: the matter of Wigner's friend 77 and the matter of Bell's shifty split.
78
In Wigner's scenario, his friend (F ) has performed a measurement on a system S with the help of an apparatus A. While for F the combined system S+A gets reduced when she becomes aware of the outcome, for Wigner the combined system S+A+F gets reduced when he is informed of the outcome by F . Wigner's scenario led him to conclude that the theory of measurement was logically consistent only "so long as I maintain my privileged position as ultimate observer." For a QBist, Wigner's state assignment, which is based on his past and (foreseeable) future experiences, is as "correct" as his friend's, based as that is on a different set of past and (foreseeable) future experiences.
The so-called Heisenberg cut (Bell's "shifty split") is what separates the system under investigation from the means of investigation. While for Heisenberg the location of the cut was more or less arbitrary, for Bohr it was determined by the measurement setup.
m Because nothing guarantees the definiteness of outcome-indicating properties like the incontestable definiteness of experience, in the QBist story the experience of the individual user takes the place of the measurement setup. Hence, there are as many splits as there are users, and there is nothing shifty about them. As Mermin explains,
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Each split is between an object (the world) and a subject (an agent's irreducible awareness of her or his own experience). Setting m See Camilleri and Schlosshauer 79 for a discussion of Bohr's and Heisenberg's divergent views on this matter. aside dreams or hallucinations, I, as agent, have no trouble making such a distinction, and I assume that you don't either. Vagueness and ambiguity only arise if one fails to acknowledge that the splits reside not in the objective world, but at the boundaries between that world and the experiences of the various agents who use quantum mechanics.
While we may disregard the philosophically dubious concept of awareness of one's own experience, the ambiguity of the expression "objective world" must be resolved before QBism can rightfully claim consistency. Granted that the split does not reside in the objective world, there remains the question as to the intension of the expression. Which does Mermin have in mind? The world of the internal realist, which originates in our respective "spheres of consciousness"-the part of our experience that is amenable to objectivation, about which we can think as if it existed independently of our thoughts and perceptions, though in reality it does not? Or the world on which we act with our instruments? The ambiguity comes into sharper focus when Mermin writes (emphasis added) that
[s]cience is a collaborative human effort to find, through our individual actions on the world and our verbal communications with each other, a model for what is common to all of our privately constructed external worlds.
Those who reject QBism . . . reify the common external world we have all negotiated with each other, purging from the story any reference to the origins of our common world in the private experiences we try to share with each other through language.
3
This means that there is another world, besides the common external world we have all negotiated with each other, namely the world on which we act. We must bear in mind that QBists regard the measuring apparatus as "an extension of the agent himself . . . like a prosthetic hand", 75 and that, for them, quantum mechanics is "a theory of stimulation and response":
The agent, through the process of quantum measurement stimulates the world external to himself. The world, in return, stimulates a response in the agent that is quantified by a change in his beliefs-i.e., by a change from a prior to a posterior quantum state. Somewhere in the structure of those belief changes lies quantum theory's most direct statement about what we believe of the world as it is without agents.
The world the agent touches with his prosthetic hand is not our common external world, for the latter contains the agent's prosthetic hand. It is the unspeakable world "as it is without agents," which only becomes speakable through the manner in which it is stimulated (i.e., by saying in ordinary language what the agent has done) and through the manner in which it responds (i.e., by saying in ordinary language what the agent has learned).
"Outsourcing" the split
Thus there is another boundary at which the Heisenberg cut can be placed. This too does not reside in the objective world-the objectified world, the world of sense impressions organized into objects, the world we have all negotiated with each other. As there is a "near" boundary to this world (between it and the private experiences in which it originates), so there is a "far" boundary to it (between it and the world as it is without agents).
This calls into question the wisdom of treating "all physical systems in the same way, including atoms, beam splitters, Stern-Gerlach magnets, preparation devices, measurement apparatuses, all the way to living beings and other agents". 82 To be sure, that Wigner and his friend make objectively incompatible state assignments is and remains no cause for concern; an objective quantum state remains as much an oxymoron as a userindependent probability. But if an agent has firm reasons to believe that an outcome is present in another agent's experience, he has equally firm reasons to believe that an outcome exists in our common external world. If a sane, healthy, and honest user has learned the value of a quantum observable, he will communicate it to anyone who cares to ask. It is immaterial if that value exists solely in his mind or in the minds of two, two hundred, or two million users. Wigner has every right to assign to the combined system S+A+F an incoherent mixture (representing his ignorance of what his friend has found) once he is certain that she has obtained (experienced) an outcome. If QBists seem unwilling to accept this, the reason can only be that they take it to mean placing the Heisenberg cut slap-bang in the middle of the objective world. What it actually means is placing the cut at the far boundary of that world.
Kant was the first to make our common external world the subject of empirical science. Beyond it lay the empirically inaccessible thing or world in itself, a transcendent reality which had the power to affect us in such a way that we have the sensations that we do, and that we are able to organize our sensations into objects that interact with each other and change in accordance with laws of nature.
Bohr was the first to realize that empirical knowledge need not be limited to what is accessible to our senses, and that therefore it does not have to be solely a knowledge of interacting, re-identifiable objects and causally connected events. But he also realized that what was not directly accessible to our senses could not be expected to conform to the spatiotemporal conditions of human experience, and thus could not be expected to be describable in any language we can understand. What remained capable of being so described was the experimental context, the holistic quantum phenomenon.
And QBism is the first theory of science that tackles the mystery of the relation between our common external world and the world in itself: "Somewhere in the structure of those belief changes lies quantum theory's most direct statement about what we believe of the world as it is without agents." And it does this in a way nobody before them appears to have thought of-without positing a correspondence between the two realities, without inserting an evolving ontological state between the "fixation of the initial state" and the test of "the possible predictions as regards subsequent observable properties" (as the Newmanniac does), and without attempting to explain correlata in terms of their correlations (as the Ψ-ontologist does). This is no mean achievement.
Coda
To the irony of Bohr's drawing the battle lines in a way which put Kant and himself on opposing sides, we must now add the irony of QBists' drawing the battle lines in a way which puts Bohr and themselves on opposing sides, notwithstanding that "QBism agrees with Bohr that the primitive concept of experience is fundamental to an understanding of science".
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Two things appear to be responsible for this: (i) the fact that presently "Bohr's unique views are almost universally either overlooked completely or distorted beyond recognition", 83 which cannot but have adversely affected QBists' appreciation of Bohr, and (ii) their misunderstanding the role that experimental arrangements played in Bohr's epistemology, n taking them to be reified experiences purged of "any reference to the origins of our common world in the private experiences we try to share with each other through language".
3 (Recall the reason, indicated in Sec. 6, why Bohr ceased to refer to "our forms of perception" at about the time he began to n As in "the Copenhagen view that measurement outcomes belong to an objective ('classical') domain that is independent of agents and/or their experience". 76 speak of "experimental arrangements.") When Bohr wrote that the description of atomic phenomena has "a perfectly objective character," it was "in the sense that no explicit reference is made to any individual observer" (emphasis added). 84 What Bohr understands by objectivity is "a description by means of a language common to all . . . in which people may communicate with each other in the relevant field".
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In a misguided attempt to contrast the use of language made by QBists with that made by Bohr, Mermin contends that in QBism language merely serves to compare "our privately constructed external worlds": "Language is the only means by which different users of quantum mechanics can attempt to compare their own private experiences". 3 There is no such thing as a privately constructed external world. Nobody can construct an external world all by himself. Before users can compare their private experiences, they must be able formulate them, and this they cannot do unless they already are in possession of a common language, a shared repertoire of concepts. How could Alice tell Bob that she has the experience of a table if they do not have a shared knowledge of the proper use of the word "table"? Our common language and "the common external world we have all negotiated with each other" have evolved in tandem.
Finally, there is the strange claim that quantum mechanics is "explicitly local in the QBist interpretation". 76 According to Fuchs,
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[QBism] gives each quantum state a home. Indeed, a home localized in space and time-namely, the physical site of the agent who assigns it! By this method, one expels once and for all the fear that quantum mechanics leads to "spooky action at a distance."
A quantum state has its home in an agent's mind, not at any physical site-which could only be a site in our common external world, since in "the world as it is without agents" there are no agents. No less a person than Schrödinger, who according to the QBist triumvirate Fuchs, Mermin, and Schack took "a QBist view" of science, 76 explained why inserting minds into our common external world, is a bad idea. By the very fact that we treat some of our experiences as aspects of a shared external world, we exclude ourselves from this world: "We step with our own person back into the part of an onlooker who does not belong to the world, which by this very procedure becomes an objective world". 87 If we then mistake the mind's creation for a mind-independent real world, we are left with no choice but to re-insert the mind in that world: "I so to speak put my own sentient self (which had constructed this world as a mental product) back into it-with the pandemonium of disastrous logical consequences" that flow from this error, such as "our fruitless quest for the place where mind acts on matter or vice-versa."
It is strange indeed to hear a QBist voice the idea that spooky action at a distance is something to be feared. To banish it by claiming that quantum mechanics is local is to concede way too much to those who fancy themselves as modeling a reality not of their own making. Diachronic correlations are as inexplicable as synchronic ones. We know (and can know) as little of a physical process by which an event here and now contributes to determine the probability of a later event here as we know (and can know) of a physical process by which an event here and now contributes to determine the probability of a distant event now. That the transmogrification of correlations into explanations has never been more than a sleight of hand, should be especially obvious when the correlata are viewed as responses from a reality beyond the far boundary of our common external world.
These strictures are by no means detrimental to the QBist enterprise. They are included here as a friendly exhortation for QBists to be more consistent in expressing their views. Instead of saying, for example, that QBism is explicitly local, they would be better off saying that it is neither local nor nonlocal in the realist's sense of these terms.
What I would like to say in concluding is that QBists have much to learn from Bohr, once they put aside their misconceptions about his views. Bohr's views, rightly understood, can greatly help in clarifying and defending the QBist position. In order to preserve the Kantian decontextualization of the experienced world-the ability to organize sensations into objects from which the experiencing subject can remove itself-Bohr switched from talking about our forms of perception to talking about experimental arrangements, and he substituted phenomena for objects as the principal referents of atomic physics. Yet he never lost sight of the universal context of human experience. QBism, through its emphasis on the individual experiencing subject, brings home the intersubjective constitution of our common external world more forcefully than Bohr did. (The time wasn't ripe for this then. Perhaps it is now.) If measurements are irreversible and outcomes definite, it is because the experiences of each subject are irreversible and definite. Bohr, on the other hand, gave us all the arguments we need to extend to our common external world the irreversibility of measurements and the definiteness of outcomes.
Appendix: The Born rule according to QBism
If quantum theory is so closely allied with probability theory, why is it not written in a language that starts with probability, rather than a language that ends with it? -Christopher A. Fuchs 86 For QBists, quantum mechanics is a generalization of the Bayesian theory of probability. It is a calculus of consistency-a set of criteria for testing coherence between beliefs that are relevant to rational decision making. As there are no external criteria for declaring a probability judgment right or wrong, so there are no external criteria for declaring a quantum state assignment right or wrong. The only criterion for the adequacy of a probability judgment or a state assignment is internal coherence between beliefs. The Born rule therefore is not simply a rule for updating probabilities, for getting new ones from old. It is a rule for relating probability assignments and constraining them. As such, it can be expressed entirely in terms of probabilities.
The proof of the last claim requires the use of positive operator valued measures (POVMs), which are generalizations of the standard projector valued measures used by von Neumann 62 and Dirac. 68 It goes like this: While a density operator ρ determines a potentially infinite number of probabilities, these cannot all be independent. On a d-dimensional Hilbert space, ρ is completely determined by the d 2 probabilities it assigns to the outcomes (represented by linearly independent positive operators E i ) of an informationally complete measurement. Any density operator ρ therefore corresponds to a vector whose d 2 components are the Born probabilities
and any POVM {F j } corresponds to a matrix whose elements are the conditional probabilities
where the Π i are 1-dimensional projectors proportional to E i . This makes it possible to write the Born rule in the generic form
where f depends on the details of the informationally complete measurement {E i }.
The function f takes a particularly simple form if the positive operators E i constitute a symmetric informationally complete (SIC) measurement.
In this case one of the ways in which the Born rule can be written is 86, 88 q(F j ) =
If the positive operators F j are mutually orthogonal projectors representing the outcomes of a complete von Neumann measurement, the Born rule takes the even simpler form
While the probabilities (4) and (5) are expressed in terms of (i) the probabilities p i that an agent assigns to the possible outcomes of the SIC measurement and (ii) the conditional probabilities R ji that the agent assigns to the possible outcomes of a subsequent measurement if the SIC measurement is actually made, they pertain to a situation in which the SIC measurement is not made. If it is made, the law of total probability applies, and we have that
R ji p i .
Comparing Eqs. (4) and (5) with Eq. (6), one can see that "[t]he Born Rule is nothing but a kind of Quantum Law of Total Probability! No complex amplitudes, no operators-only probabilities in, and probabilities out".
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QBists hope to eventually be in a position to derive the standard Hilbert space formalism from the Born rule. And they hope so to distill the essence of quantum mechanics and the essential characteristic of the quantum world.
o This a fascinating, highly ambitious, and seriously challenging project. Do SIC measurements even exist? Unfortunately, proofs of their existence are elusive. As of May 2017, such proofs have been found for all dimensions up to d=151, and for a few others up to 323. 75 The mood of the QBist community nevertheless is that a SIC measurement should exist for every finite dimension. That said, it must be stressed that the general form of the Born rule, Eq. (3), does not depend on the existence of SIC measurements; it only presupposes informationally complete POVMs, and these are known to exist for all finite dimensions.
o While the Born rule is normative-it guides an agent's behavior in a world that is fundamentally quantum-it is also an empirical rule. It is a statement about the quantum world, indirectly expressed as a calculus of consistency for bets placed on the outcomes of measurements.
